Comparative Analysis of Free Will in Western and Eastern Traditions

Thesis Abstract

This study investigates how conceptions of free will are articulated and used across Western and Eastern philosophical traditions to influence moral responsibility, autonomy, and agency in contemporary ethical and legal discourse. While Western theories frequently foreground metaphysical agency and compatibilist or libertarian accounts, Eastern perspectives—encompassing Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Daoist frameworks—often emphasize relationality, interdependence, and karma-like considerations, thereby shaping divergent intuitions about responsibility and freedom. The problem addressed is whether these divergent frameworks yield commensurate normative implications for accountability in modern pluralistic societies, and how cross-cultural dialogue might illuminate latent assumptions in each tradition. The aim is to assess cross-cultural continuities and tensions in the conception of free will, with three specific objectives (i) to map core concepts and criteria of free will across major Western and Eastern philosophical texts from Aristotle and Kant to Nagarjuna and Confucius; (ii) to evaluate how these conceptions inform contemporary judgments about moral responsibility through empirical and theoretical analysis; and (iii) to identify integrative insights that could enrich global debates on autonomy, legal accountability, and moral psychology. The study hypothesizes that Western models emphasize agentive causation and locus of control, whereas Eastern frameworks foreground relational constraints and interdependent origination, leading to differing implications for culpability under similar normative scenarios; it further hypothesizes that cross-cultural synthesis can yield more context-sensitive models of responsibility that accommodate both individual agency and social interdependence. A mixed-methods design is employed. The philosophical component comprises a rigorous textual analysis of 60 primary sources (20 Western texts including Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes, Hume, Kant, and Frankfurt; 40 Eastern texts including Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, and Dharmakirti) and 30 secondary scholarly commentaries to establish a comparative framework. The empirical component uses a cross-cultural survey of 1,200 university students across two Western and two Eastern universities, complemented by 40 in-depth semi-structured interviews with philosophy faculty, ethicists, and legal scholars. Data collection instruments include a standardized coding scheme for free-will attributions in hypothetical moral scenarios, validated scales for perceived autonomy (a modified autonomy-support scale) and moral responsibility (a revised responsibility attribution inventory), and interview protocols designed to elicit reasoning patterns across traditions. Validity and reliability procedures include intercoder reliability checks (Cohen’s kappa > .80 for qualitative coding), and pilot testing (n=60) to ensure cross-cultural equivalence of survey items. Data analysis combines thematic analysis for qualitative data and multivariate techniques for quantitative data, including MANOVA to test differences in responsibility judgments across cultural frames, and regression analyses to examine the predictive power of perceived autonomy and interdependence on attributions of free will and culpability. A structural equation model (SEM) will be estimated to assess the relationships among philosophical constructs, perceived agency, and moral judgment, with model fit indices (CFI, TLI > .90; RMSEA < .08) to establish construct validity. Network analysis will be employed to map epistemic influences among scholars and how ideas diffuse across traditions. Key expected findings include (i) a delineation of distinct criteria for free will in Western versus Eastern traditions, (ii) robust cross-cultural differences in moral responsibility attributions in scenarios involving coercion, addiction, and social constraints, (iii) evidence that perceptions of interdependence modulate the strength of free-will commitments, and (iv) indications that integrative models combining agency with relational constraints predict moral judgments more accurately than monistic theories. The study contributes to knowledge by clarifying how culturally embedded concepts of freedom shape normative judgments in ethics and law, informing philosophy of mind, and enhancing cross-cultural legal and educational discourse on autonomy and accountability. The conclusion anticipates that a pluralistic account, which acknowledges both agentive and relational dimensions of freedom, offers a more comprehensive framework for evaluating responsibility in diverse societies. Recommendations include developing culturally sensitive curricula for philosophy and law, integrating interdependence-sensitive measures in assessment of autonomy, and promoting interdisciplinary dialogue among philosophers, cognitive scientists, and legal scholars to refine global conceptions of free will.