Comparative Analysis of Free Will and Determinism Across Traditions

Thesis Abstract

This study investigates how conceptions of free will and determinism are formulated, defended, and interpreted across Western philosophy, East Asian thought, and African philosophical traditions, addressing the problem of cross-cultural legitimacy and interpretive differences in agency and causation. The aim is to compare core conceptions of freedom, responsibility, causation, and moral accountability to identify convergences and tensions that illuminate the universality or plurality of human agency. Specific objectives are to (1) map the definitional spectra of free will and determinism in selected traditions, (2) analyze the role of causation, chance, and moral responsibility within each tradition, (3) evaluate the influence of theological, metaphysical, and naturalistic assumptions on free will discourse, (4) assess cross-cultural interpretive challenges in translating and applying canonical concepts, and (5) propose a framework for intercultural philosophical dialogue on agency. The study adopts a comparative hermeneutic research design, complemented by analytic and thematic components. The population consists of primary texts and contemporary commentaries from three traditions Aristotle and Stoicism (Western classical), ConfucianDaoist thought (East Asian), and Ubuntu-influenced African ethical discourse (African philosophy). A purposive sample of 60 primary sources (15 per tradition) and 40 secondary sources (20 per tradition) will be analyzed. Data collection instruments include a structured coding schema for conceptual themes (agency, autonomy, determinism, moral responsibility, causality, contingency, rationality) and a source-tracking log to capture interpretive contexts and authorial aims. Validity will be pursued through triangulation of primary texts, cross-tradition secondary scholarship, and expert consultation with philosophers specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of action. Reliability will be enhanced by intercoder reliability checks achieving Cohen’s kappa of at least 0.80 on thematic coding. Analytical methods combine comparative content analysis with thematic synthesis and formal argument mapping. Thematic analysis will identify core conceptual families within and across traditions, followed by cross-cutting synthesis to reveal convergences and disjunctures. Argument mapping will diagram the inferential structures of positions on free will and determinism in each tradition. Where applicable, a qualitative cross-cultural hermeneutic interpretation will be used to examine translation artifacts and semantic shifts. A normative assessment will consider implications for moral responsibility and judicial semantics in pluralistic societies. The study will also explore potential correlations between doctrinal commitments and attitudes toward autonomy, using descriptive cross-tabulations where textual data allow. Expected findings include (i) distinct yet overlapping conceptual schemas of agency, with Western thought emphasizing deliberative autonomy and determinism debates, East Asian traditions underscoring situational harmony and relational causation, and African discourse foregrounding communal causation and moral accountability; (ii) varying degrees of compatibilist versus incompatibilist readings across traditions, shaped by metaphysical commitments and soteriological or ethical aims; (iii) evidence of translation-induced shifts in agency concepts, including the reframing of freedom as social virtue or relational capacity rather than absolute independence; (iv) robust identification of cross-cultural tensions between individualistic liberal notions of autonomy and communitarian or interdependent models of agency; and (v) a synthesized framework for intercultural critical dialogue on agency and responsibility. The study contributes to knowledge by articulating a cross-tradition map of free will and determinism that clarifies methodological and interpretive challenges in comparative philosophy, supplies a robust evidence base for intercultural ethics and jurisprudence, and offers a unified analytic vocabulary for agency across philosophical traditions. It also informs debates in philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and applied ethics, including criminal law and social policy, where conceptions of freedom and responsibility shape judgment and governance. The main conclusion anticipates that while traditions diverge in metaphysical commitments, there exists a substantive core around evaluative agency—rooted in rational deliberation, relational causation, and communal accountability—that can be fruitfully reconciled through dialogic interpretive frameworks. Recommendations include developing cross-cultural curricula that incorporate canonical and non-canonical texts, fostering collaborative interpretation workshops among philosophers from diverse traditions, and applying the framework to empirical research on lay intuitions about free will and moral responsibility in multicultural societies.