A Valence-Driven Framework for Moral Epistemic Justification

Thesis Abstract

This study investigates how valence dynamics influence moral epistemic justification, addressing the problem that moral belief formation often hinges on affective states rather than structured evidential support, which can yield biased or unstable moral judgments in real-world decision contexts. The aim is to develop and validate a valence-driven framework that delineates how positive and negative affect modulate epistemic justification processes for moral beliefs, and to identify conditions under which valence enhances or undermines justificatory quality. Specific objectives are to (1) articulate a theoretical model integrating affective valence with epistemic justification criteria (truth-conduciveness, coherence, and social reliability) drawing on appraisal theories of emotion and moral realism, (2) examine how affective valence interacts with moral heuristics and moral luck in shaping justification strength, (3) empirically test the framework across disciplinary contexts (bioethics, legal ethics, and business ethics) to assess cross-domain robustness, and (4) propose normative implications for rational moral deliberation and policy design. The study adopts an explanatory sequential mixed-methods design. In the quantitative phase, a representative sample of 1,200 adults drawn from university communities and professional networks will complete validated instruments measuring affective valence (Positive and Negative Affect Schedule), perceived moral truth-conduciveness, coherence of belief systems, social reliability of sources, and epistemic justification strength for a set of vignettes representing controversial moral scenarios. Data will be analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the proposed valence-driven pathways and multi-group analyses to examine domain-specific variations. In the qualitative phase, 40 purposively selected participants representing high and low justification profiles will engage in semi-structured interviews to elicit detailed accounts of how affective states inform evaluative criteria and belief revision processes; thematic analysis will identify recurrent patterns and potential mediators such as moral emotions, motivational priorities, and epistemic confianza. The study will justify instrument validity through confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) and test-retest reliability assessments; cross-validation will be performed using holdout samples. The expected findings include (a) a robust structural model in which valence exerts significant direct effects on justification criteria and indirect effects mediated by moral emotions and motivational orientation; (b) evidence that positive valence strengthens coherence and perceived social reliability while potentially biasing truth-conduciveness assessments under certain cognitive load conditions; (c) evidence that negative valence heightens vigilance to evidential gaps, thereby increasing diligence in truth-conduciveness and source credibility assessments but potentially reducing perceived social reliability; (d) domain-specific moderation effects indicating greater valence sensitivity in bioethics and legal ethics contexts due to professionalnorms and stakeholder scrutiny. The results will be interpreted in light of theories of emotion and moral cognition, including appraisal theory, the virtue-epistemic approach to moral justification, and Humean sentiment-based reasoning. Contributions to knowledge include (i) the first integrative valence-driven model of moral epistemic justification that operationalizes truth-conduciveness, coherence, and social reliability within affective dynamics; (ii) empirical evidence clarifying when affect improves or degrades justificatory quality across moral domains; (iii) methodological advancement through a mixed-methods framework that triangulates quantitative pathways with qualitative rationalizations, enhancing the robustness of normative inferences; (iv) policy and educational implications for moral training, ethical decision-making, and institutional governance that promote rational deliberation without neglecting affective signals. The study concludes that valence is a central, nontrivial determinant of moral epistemic justification, with nuanced consequences for rational moral deliberation. It recommends the development of decision-support tools that calibrate affective inputs and evidential evaluation, and it suggests curricular interventions in ethics education that cultivate metacognitive awareness of valence effects on justification processes.