Great Power Competition and Middle Power Diplomacy: A Comparative Analysis of Europe and Asia (2000–2025)

Thesis Abstract

In an era of renewed great power rivalry, this study examines how middle powers in Europe and Asia navigate strategic competition between dominant states—primarily the United States, China, and Russia—through diplomacy, alignment, and hedging strategies. The central problem is to understand whether middle powers deploy convergent or divergent diplomatic behaviors across regions in response to the external pressures of great power competition, and how regional security architectures shape these responses. The aim is to illuminate the conditions under which middle powers leverage diplomacy to maximize strategic autonomy and influence, and to assess the differential effectiveness of such strategies in European versus Asian contexts. The specific objectives are (1) to map the external pressure profiles faced by selected middle powers in Europe (Sweden, Norway, and the Netherlands) and Asia (Singapore, Malaysia, and Vietnam) from 2000 to 2025; (2) to analyze the diplomatic tools—alliances, balancing, diversification of partnerships, and normative leadership—that middle powers employ to manage great power competition; (3) to evaluate the role of regional architectures (NATO, EU, ASEAN, and security pacts) in shaping middle-power strategies; (4) to test the applicability of existing theories of hedging, bandwagoning, and balance of power to cross-regional cases; and (5) to develop a comparative framework that explains differential outcomes in policy influence and resilience. The study employs a mixed-methods design integrating quantitative and qualitative strands. The population consists of official policy documents, strategic white papers, and parliamentary debates from the six case countries between 2000 and 2025. The sample comprises 180 policy documents (30 per country-year block) and 60 semi-structured elite interviews with national security advisors, foreign ministry officials, and think-tank analysts (10 interviews per region). Data collection instruments include a standardized document coding scheme for content analysis, a semi-structured interview protocol, and a structured survey instrument for triangulation. Validity and reliability are ensured through inter-coder reliability checks (Cohen’s kappa > 0.75), pilot testing of interview questions, and triangulation across official documents, secondary sources, and interview data. Analytical techniques combine process tracing and regression analysis. Thematic analysis will be applied to interview transcripts to identify patterns of hedging, alignment, and diversification, drawing on Braun and Clarke’s methodology. Quantitative analysis will utilize panel data regression to test the impact of regional security architecture variables (e.g., NATO engagement intensity, EU sanctions regimes, ASEAN institutional depth) on middle-power diplomatic outcomes, controlling for GDP, defense expenditure, and political regime type. Network analysis will map dyadic and plurilateral alignments to assess shifts in strategic partnerships over time. The theoretical framework integrates German School realism and liberal institutionalism, with explicit engagement of hedging theory (Lundestad) and balance theory, adapted to cross-regional contexts, and supplemented by constructivist insights on legitimacy and norm diffusion. Expected findings indicate that European middle powers favor hedging and EU-aligned diversification, leveraging NATO and EU frameworks to modulate access without provoking direct confrontations with great powers, while Asian middle powers emphasize agile alignment strategies, using ASEAN-centered forums and bilateral hedging to pursue autonomy amid a more fluid great power contestation. Regional security architecture is anticipated to differentially constrain or enable policy maneuvering in Europe, institutionalized frameworks provide stability and legitimacy to middle-power actions; in Asia, strategic ambiguity and rapid hedging correlate with higher variance in outcomes across states. The study contributes to knowledge by providing a replicable cross-regional framework for understanding middle-power diplomacy under great power competition, refining theories of hedging and balance with empirical evidence from two distinct security environments, and offering a calibrated assessment of policy tools that enhance middle-power resilience. Policy implications include recommendations for European states to institutionalize more robust strategic partnerships and for Asian middle powers to cultivate diversified security arrangements without undermining regional cohesion. The main conclusion posits that middle powers in both regions increase diplomatic influence when combining hedging with targeted alignment within regional architectures, but regional context governs the effectiveness and sustainability of these strategies. Recommendations emphasize strengthening interoperable alliance mechanisms, expanding multilateral fora to include middle-power voices, and investing in strategic foresight and coalition-building capacities to adapt to evolving great power dynamics.