A Multilevel Framework for Strategic Dependence in Great-Power Rivalry

Thesis Abstract

This study addresses the persistent puzzle of how great powers manage strategic dependencies within a rapidly shifting international system characterized by multipolar competition, rising technologies, and interdependent economics, by developing a multilevel framework that links individual state preferences, organizational decision processes, and systemic pressures to observable outcomes in rivalry dynamics. The aim is to construct a theory-driven framework that explicates how strategic dependence emerges, evolves, and constrains policy choices across levels of analysis, and to test its predictive capacity for crisis and post-crisis behavior among leading powers. Specific objectives are to (i) delineate the key mechanisms of strategic dependence at the national, dyadic, and systemic levels; (ii) identify signaling channels, bargaining strategies, and interdependence motifs that mediate dependences; (iii) assess the moderating roles of alliance structures, domestic political constraints, and economic interdependence on strategic options; and (iv) evaluate the framework’s explanatory power by applying it to recent episodes of great-power interaction involving the United States, the European Union, China, and Russia from 2010 to 2024. The methodological design adopts a mixed-methods approach anchored in a multi-sited case comparison and theory-testing, integrating both qualitative and quantitative strands. The population comprises elite decision-making units within the governing and foreign-policy establishments of the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union. The sample includes 12 dyads representing core great-power interactions and four subsidiary cases illustrating cross-level linkages, chosen to maximize variation in alliance configurations, economic interdependence, and strategic objectives. Data are drawn from primary sources (official policy statements, meeting records, diplomatic cables where available, and executive speeches), complemented by secondary sources (government white papers, intelligence assessments, think-tank analyses, and scholarly monographs). A dataset of 200+ codified events and 150 policy decisions spanning 2010–2024 will be constructed, with variables capturing national interests, perceived dependence, bargaining leverage, and execution outcomes. Instruments include a structured coding scheme for qualitative content analysis of decision-making narratives, event-distribution coding for time-series analysis, and survey instruments to gauge elite perceptions of strategic risk. Validity and reliability are ensured via triangulation, intercoder reliability checks (Cohen’s kappa > 0.70), pilot coding rounds, and instrument pre-testing with expert panels. Data analysis combines qualitative Thematic Analysis to extract mechanisms of dependence at the national and organizational levels with quantitative methods including Multilevel Regression Analysis to test cross-level hypotheses, Event-Sequence Modelling to trace cascading effects, and Nonlinear Time-Series Techniques to detect regime-sensitive shifts. A system-dynamics-inspired analytical framework will be used to illustrate feedback loops among state preferences, alliance commitments, and systemic pressures, while network analysis will map interdependence and alliance structures. Key expected findings include (i) evidence that strategic dependence operates through measurable channels of signals, credibility, and coercive leverage, with distinct patterns across dyads based on alliance alignment and economic ties; (ii) demonstration that domestic political synchronization and bureaucratic politics significantly mediate the translation of systemic pressures into policy choices; (iii) identification of threshold effects where incremental increases in interdependence yield nonlinear changes in strategic risk-taking and crisis behavior; and (iv) confirmation that multilevel interdependencies produce predictable moderation effects on bargaining outcomes, facilitating or constraining escalation depending on institutionalized channels of communication and crisis management. The study contributes to knowledge by operationalizing a multilevel theoretical framework that integrates micro-level cognition and bureaucratic politics with meso-level organizational dynamics and macro-level systemic constraints, offering a robust explanatory model for great-power rivalry. It advances theories of strategic dependence, balance of power, and interdependence by detailing cross-level mechanisms, testable propositions, and policy-relevant implications for crisis prevention, alliance design, and economic statecraft. The main conclusion is that strategic dependence is a dynamic, emergent property of interacting levels, and effective management requires coherent alignment of domestic incentives, organizational decision rules, and systemic signaling. Recommendations include reforms in diplomatic communication channels to reduce misperception, diversification of leverage portfolios across economic and technological domains, and the institutionalization of crisis management protocols that incorporate multilevel feedback mechanisms to dampen miscalculation during high-stakes episodes.